# Question 2. Consider the situation represented by the following bimatrix: L M R U 1,0 2,5 -2,-1 D2,1 2,1 -1,0 (a) Write down the strategic form of this game. (b) Is there a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. (e) Is there a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. Note that strategic form comes in two representations: a) Matrix form (if there are two players, bimatrix) b) Explicit form which is composed of Set of players, set of strategies for each player and payoff function for each player

IYBRHT The Asker · Computer Science

Transcribed Image Text: 2. Consider the situation represented by the following bimatrix: L M R U 1,0 2,5 -2,-1 D2,1 2,1 -1,0 (a) Write down the strategic form of this game. (b) Is there a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. (e) Is there a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. Note that strategic form comes in two representations: a) Matrix form (if there are two players, bimatrix) b) Explicit form which is composed of Set of players, set of strategies for each player and payoff function for each player
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Transcribed Image Text: 2. Consider the situation represented by the following bimatrix: L M R U 1,0 2,5 -2,-1 D2,1 2,1 -1,0 (a) Write down the strategic form of this game. (b) Is there a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. (e) Is there a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain. Note that strategic form comes in two representations: a) Matrix form (if there are two players, bimatrix) b) Explicit form which is composed of Set of players, set of strategies for each player and payoff function for each player
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&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;Situation rarrA.] Strategic form rarrPlajers: rov player (ploger 1), col. player (P.2)Straregies: S_(1)={U,D},S_(2)={L,m,R}paygfs:B.] Strictly dominant strategy equmNo. Neither player has a strictly dominant strategy. [ to avoid any confusion- in the first picture the very last word is simply cut. So don't think over it too much it's of no use ] &#160; Explanation:for ployer 1 ie. P_(1): best response longrightarrow{:[BR_(1)(L)=D],[BR_(1)(m)=D","U],[BR_(1)(R)=D]:}when P_(2) peoys m, strategy U is also best response for PI. :. Pl has no strictly dominant strategy." for "{:[P_(2)","],[B_(R)(W)=m],[BR_(2)(D)=L","m]:}strategy R is never best response for P_(2). retualy strategy R is. strictly dominated by P_(2) by strategy m. asu_(2)(u,m)=5quad(greater" than ")quadu_(2)(D,R)=-1simitagy strategy m doesn't stric ... See the full answer