Question 1: Consider the situation represented by the following bimatrix:

a) Is there a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? Explain.

b) Is there a weakly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game?

c) What are the Nash equilibria of this game? Explain using best responses.

Community Answer

a) Let us assume that U and D is Actions (stretegy) of player 1 and L,M and R ir Actions/stredegy) of player 2 .Lo player 1 has no strictly dominant strategy as there is no Action. whose payoft is aluays greatier thon other ActionsfinceSimilarly for player 2 has no strictly dominant strategy as there is no Action among L,m and R whose payoff is always grecter than others. to there will ke no strict dominant strategy equilibinum.b) Player 1 has no weckly dominant strategy: as as there is no strategy in V and D whose puyoff is aliays greatpr than or equal to the pay off of other strategies.Beause if player 2 plays L then payoff from D is greater than 1 pay off from u bit if player 2 plays R then pryoff from U is greater than payoff from D for play ... See the full answer